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Abstract  
This thesis addresses two developments that have been ignored in the framing literature: the 
absence of security-related subjects in this field of research and the lack of comparative issue 
framing experiments. Although the research record to date has demonstrated highly robust 
evidence from issue framing experiments, this thesis argues that security-related subjects have 
been largely ignored in the academic debate about framing. This is striking, since security 
concerns, especially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, play a prominent role in 
contemporary political-, societal- and mass media environments in the United States and 
Europe. Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that a focus on security-issues fills the 
academic gap on comparative framing research: by comparing the influence of issue frames 
on security issues in two countries where the salience of these security issues differ (the 
United States and the Netherlands), this study examines whether pre-existing attitudes within 
the population towards security-issues might influence the strength of the effects of issue 
framing.  
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1. Introduction  
On June 7, 2013, The New York Times editorial board heavily criticized Barack Obama’s 
policy on the structural monitoring and wire-tapping of telephone and internet data of millions 
of citizens and companies by the U.S. government. According to the newspaper, the U.S. 
National Security Agency (NSA) and the FBI have direct access to online data of users 
worldwide of large internet enterprises such as Google, Facebook and Apple. The New York 
Times, that has twice supported Obama’s candidacy, sharply distances itself from the Obama 
Administration: “this surveillance […] fundamentally shifts power between the individual and 
the state, and it repudiates constitutional principles governing search, seizure and privacy” (7 
June 2013).  
  In a reaction, Obama defends the espionage practices by pointing towards “the need 
to keep American people safe and our concerns about privacy, because there are some trade-
offs involved. […] I think it is important to recognize that you can’t have a 100% security, 
and also then have a 100% privacy, and zero inconvenience […] we’re going to have to make 
some choices, as a society”1 (The White House, 2013), thereby suggesting that in this case, 
security should have the right of way. Obama’s emphasis on security issues is the logical 
consequence of a debate on security issues that has become particularly salient in the United 
States after the 9/11 attacks (Levi & Wall, 2004, p. 196; Mabee, 2007, p. 387). 
 The New York Times and President Obama, among other political actors, have been 
trying to ”frame or spin issues and events so as to cull maximum opinion benefits” (Nelson & 
Oxley, 1999, p. 1041), and lead the public to what they conceive to be the essence of this 
issue.  This process is hardly new: for decades, “government officials and journalists exercise 
political influence over each other and the public” (Entman, 2003, p. 417) through the process 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 President’s Obama statement on espionage practices can be found on the White House video 
database: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2013/06/07/president-obama-
makes-statement-affordable-care-act>, visited 8 June 2013. The discussion starts at 11:55.  
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of framing. Similarly in the academic field, political scientist have found robust evidence 
from experiments emphasizing the importance of framing: attitudes and opinions of citizens 
towards public policy and other issues are largely influenced by how the issue or event is 
framed (e.g. Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 103-104; Jacoby, 2000, p. 763; Nelson, Clawson 
& Oxley, 1997, p. 574 -575). This leads Chong (1993, p. 870) to conclude that framing could 
be described as “the essence of public opinion formation”.   
 However, although various subjects for issue framing experiments have been explored, 
it is a serious gap in the academic discourse that scholars so far have not connected research 
of the effects of issue framing with the effort to try to understand the perception of security 
issues by the public, since security issues have become a highly salient topic after 9/11 in the 
Western World (Oppermann & Viehrig, 2009, p. 932; Rehman, 2007, p. 831; De Graaf & 
Eijkman, 2011, p. 33). The debate on NSA’s espionage activities is a schoolbook example of 
such an issue. Moreover, research aimed at understanding the salience of security issues and 
the influence of issue framing upon it, might help us to understand the public and political 
debate that is centered around these issues and that has dominated a great deal of the political 
campaigns and the public debate of the last decade in Europe and the US (Entman, 2003, p. 
416 - 417; De Graaf & Eijkman, 2011, p. 34; Baker & Oneal, 2001, p. 661). 
 A second contribution this study aims to make relates to the lack of comparative issue 
framing experiments: to my knowledge, no research exists that uses a comparative approach 
between various countries to the study of framing effects. Thus, it remains unquestioned 
whether framing effects would differentiate when the same framing experiments would be 
executed in different countries, characterized by distinctive social and historical backgrounds.  
Security issues are an interesting subject for such an experiment because, as will be argued in 
this study, although security issues have been at the center of the political debate on both 
sides of the Atlantic, there are differences observable between certain European countries and 
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the United States when it comes to the relative salience of these issues (Oppermann & 
Viehrig, 2009, p. 932). Asking questions of this kind could help us develop even better 
understanding of issue framing as a phenomenon and of the relationship between framing 
effects and these pre-existing parameters.  
 In order to address these issues, this thesis will conduct an issue framing experiment in 
two countries: the United States and the Netherlands. It will be argued that these countries 
differ in their level of salience for security issues, where in the U.S. the salience of security 
issues is higher compared to the Netherlands (e.g. World Values Survey, 2005). In order to 
test the effects of issue framing on security issues and to make a comparison between the 
framing effects in two countries, this thesis has designed an experiment with two framing 
conditions. Like in the controversy between Obama and the New York Times, the framing 
conditions will either stress the importance of ‘safety’ or ‘security’, in a fictive situation 
where the New Zealand government proposes a new law which allows unrestricted phone-
tapping of its population. Derived from this experiment, the focus of this research is (1) What 
is the effect of issue framing on the attitudes of participants toward a security-bill expanding 
government’s authorities? and (2) What is the effect of various salience levels of security 
issues in the United States and the Netherlands on the effectiveness of frames?  
 This thesis will firstly discuss the conceptualization and empirical evidence of 
framing. Furthermore, the differences between framing and the concepts of priming and 
persuasion will be discussed, in order to clarify the concept of framing one step further. 
Subsequently, this thesis will focus on the increased salience of security issues in the Western 
World and argue why it is important that framing research should give attention to these 
security issues. From this review, various hypotheses will be derived. The research design and 
methodology section will explain the procedure of the experiment that tested these 
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hypotheses, and the results of this research will be presented in the data analysis. Finally, the 
limitations and implications of this research will be explained in the discussion.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Framing: Conceptual Clarification  
The question of how to define the concept of framing is an issue of ongoing scholarly debate 
(Entman, 1993, p. 51; Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 114). Due to the use of the concept 
across a range of academic disciplines, there exists conceptual confusion and disagreement 
about the various types of framing effects and the relationship between framing and related 
concepts  (Borah, 2011, p. 246; Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 114; Entman, 1993, p. 51; 
Nelson & Oxley, 1999, p. 1041). As Scheufele (1999, p. 103) has summarized the problem: 
“Partly because of these vague conceptualizations, the term framing has been used repeatedly 
to label similar but distinctly different approaches” (emphasis in original).  
 A starting point in the clarification of this concept is provided by the work of Entman 
(1993, p. 51; De Vreese, 2012, p. 366). The author argues that framing is characterized by 
“selection and salience” (1993, p. 52). According to Edelman (1993, p. 231), the different 
interpretations of issues, events and phenomena are manifold: “The social world is a 
kaleidoscope of potential realities”. Hence,  a communication source should firstly identify 
and  “select some aspects” of such a potential reality (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Secondly, this 
adopted view of reality is actively promoted by emphasizing certain relevant considerations of 
an issue, thereby obscuring the role of other aspects (Slothuus, 2008, p. 1). In other words, by 
making some aspects of an issue more “noticeable, meaningful or memorable to audiences” 
(Entman, 1993, p. 52), these selected aspects of a potential reality are made more salient. 
Consequently, framing gives “meaning to an unfolding strip of events […], suggesting what 
the controversy is about” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). In other words, framing 
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revolves around the guidance of the audience towards “the essence of the issue” (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1987, p. 143), as perceived by politicians, journalists or other opinion makers 
(e.g. Slothuus, 2008, p. 1).  
 Furthermore, Entman (1993, p. 52) argues that most frames may go further than 
“selection and salience”: frames could also “make moral judgments [and] suggest remedies” 
for the audience to evaluate the issue or problem at stake. In other words, a frame may 
suggest certain recommendations about “preferred policy directions” (Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1987, p.143) or a moral direction, which might be reflected in the eventual stance 
or actions of the public. As a result, Entman takes the concept of framing one step further by 
pointing towards the eventual effects framing might have on people’s attitudes and opinions: 
a framing effect “occur[s] when (often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an 
event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). In 
other words, as Druckman & Nelson (2003, p. 730) have summarized the key point: framing 
has an effect when “a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations 
causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions” (e.g. 
Druckman, 2001b, pp. 226 – 231).   
 
2.2 Evidence of Framing Effects  
The research record to date demonstrates “highly robust and relevant” evidence for framing 
effects (Druckman, 2004, p. 673): numerous studies across a range of issues have shown that 
attitudes, behavior and public opinion are largely affected by how the issue or event is framed 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 109; Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004, p. 3; Nelson & Oxley, 1999, 
p. 1042)2.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  However, it should be noted that a number of studies have questioned the robustness of 
framing effects. For instance, Druckman (2001a, p. 62) argues that the effects measured in 
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 A well-known example is provided by the study of Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997, 
p. 578). The scholars presented two randomly selected groups of participants a fictive 
situation: a Ku Klux Klan rally was held in a small city in Ohio, after which a KKK-leader 
would give a speech. In the news coverage to which the participants were exposed, most of 
the facts were the same. However, the ‘free speech’ frame emphasized the right of the KKK 
to voice their controversial points of view, whereas the ‘public order’ frame stressed safety 
issues associated with the rally (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997, p. 581). This emphasis was 
added through the use of different quotes, images and interviews (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 
1997, p. 571). The framing conditions influenced the level of political tolerance towards the 
KKK-rally: participants exposed to the ‘free speech’ frame showed significantly higher 
support for the rally compared with people exposed to the ‘public order’ treatment (Nelson, 
Clawson & Oxley, 1997, p. 572).  
 Various other framing experiments have demonstrated that attitudes and behavior of 
its respondents is affected by how issues or events are framed.  For instance, Schaffner & 
Atkinson (2010, p. 122) demonstrate in their experiment that, regarding specific tax-
regulations for deceased citizens, individuals exposed to the “estate tax” frame expressed 
more support for this tax than respondents exposed to the “death tax” frame (see also Jacoby, 
2000, p. 750). Another example is provided by Kinder & Sanders (1990, p. 134). These 
scholars showed that Caucasian American respondents exposed to the “reserve 
discrimination” frame expressed more support for affirmative action policies in comparison to 
respondents exposed to the “undeserved advantage” frame.  
 Similarly, Tversky & Kahneman (1986, p. S255) have demonstrated the effects of 
framing on respondent’s behavior: participants showed more risk seeking behavior regarding 
“prospects with monetary outcomes” when their gamble was framed in terms of losing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
laboratory settings of most framing experiments “greatly diminish” when participants have 
access to “credible advice” (e.g. Fagley & Miller, 1997; Druckman, 2001b).  
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money, as opposed to the risk averse behavior when the option was framed in terms of 
gaining money (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, p. 342; Kinder & Kam, 2009, p. 40). Similar 
patterns of risk seeking- and risk avoiding behavior are observed regarding health issues (e.g. 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, p. 343; McNeil et al., 1982, p. 1261). In sum, Druckman (2004, 
p. 673) observes that scholars studying framing effects have observed the effects on 
respondent’s attitudes “over a vast array of domains (e.g. bargaining, financial, gambling, 
health, legal, political) using student, nonstudent, and so-called expert samples” (e.g. Brewer, 
Graf & Willnat, 2003, p. 503; Iyengar, 1990, pp. 34 – 36; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004, pp. 
157 – 158; Nicholson & Howard, 2003, p. 676; Grant & Rudolph, 2003, p. 462; Pan & 
Kosicki, 1993, p. 55; Chien, Lin & Worthley, 1996, p. 818; Ramirez & Verkuyten, 2011, pp. 
1579 – 1580).  
 As will be discussed in the next paragraph, although various scholars have attempted 
to clarify the differences between framing and related concepts, framing and framing effects 
are often confused with related media-concepts. In order to clarify the concept of framing one 
step further and to make a distinction between above described framing effects and related 
effects, the next paragraph will discuss the differences between the related concepts of 
framing, priming and persuasion.   
 
2.3 Framing, Priming or Persuasion?  
Despite Entman’s attempt to clarify the “fractured paradigm” (1993, p. 51) concerning 
framing, it is observed by various academics that there still exists a parsimonious and 
interchangeable use of related concepts to framing. In this context, scholars have pointed 
towards the notion of priming (e.g. Brewer, Graf & Willnat, 2003, p. 493; Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11; Weaver, 2007, p. 143). As Scheufele (2000, p. 297) has summarized 
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the main problem: “[…] Priming and framing research generally has been examined under the 
broad category of cognitive media effects”.  
 As introduced by Iyengar & Kinder (1987, p. 63), priming refers to “changes in the 
standards that people use to make political evaluations”. Priming could be defined as the 
process by which certain mental constructs are activated, thereby influencing the way 
individuals evaluate or judge certain issues, ideas or events (Domke, Shah & Wackman, 1998, 
p. 51). Similarly, as Scheufele (2000, p. 300) has defined priming: “in the priming model, 
perceived issue salience becomes the independent variable and influences the role that these 
issues or considerations play when an individual makes a judgment about a (political) actor”.  
As Weaver (2007, p. 145) has summarized the general point: through frequent exposure in 
mass media outlets, “certain issues or attributes [are made] more salient and more likely to be 
accessed in forming opinions”.   
 However, it could be argued that these descriptions of priming obtain striking 
similarities with the definition of framing. To make a clear distinction between the concepts, 
Scheufele & Tewksbury (2007, p. 11) have argued that the main difference between priming 
and framing could be found in the “accessibility-based” model: whereas priming is based on 
how often and how recent certain attributes come forward, framing is based on “how an issue 
is characterized”: it is the “difference between whether we think about an issue and how we 
think about it” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 14, emphasis added).   
  An example of priming, as provided by Iyengar & Kinder (1987, pp. 66 - 80), could 
further illustrate this distinction (see also Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 114). The authors 
argue that the general approval rates and evaluations of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency among the 
American public were heavily influenced by his performance on particular issues that were 
given prominent attention in mass media outlets, such as “energy, defense and inflation 
(Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, pp. 66 - 80; Brewer, Graf & Willnat, 2003, p. 494). As this example 
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illustrates, the evaluation of Carter’s Presidency in the priming model was mainly based on 
the fact that the issues of energy, defense and inflation were frequently and prominently 
covered, not how the content of these matters were reported. In other words, priming evolves 
around the fact that certain issues are given time, attention and exposure (i.e. energy, defense 
and inflation), whereas the “locus of effect [within framing studies] lies within the description 
of an issue”, for instance focusing on various angles concerning Carter’s defense-policy 
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 14).    
 A second related concept of framing concerns persuasion. Among others, Nelson, 
Oxley and Clawson (1997, p. 225) have attempted to make a distinction between these 
concepts (see also Scheufele, 2004, p. 411; Zaller, 1992, p. 36). These scholars describe that 
persuasion takes place when communicators convince their audience of the good attributes of 
their object: “if the audience is convinced, their general attitude about the wisdom or 
advisability of this policy should change in the direction of this new belief” (1997, p. 225). 
Again, this definition bares considerable similarity with the definition of framing. However, 
persuasion effects are based on the expectation that recipients “change their attitudes based on 
new arguments introduced by the media” (Scheufele, 2004, p. 411). This model thus assumes 
that the information of the communicator is new: “the message affects opinion because it 
contains positive or negative information about the attitude object not already part of the 
recipients’ knowledge or belief structure” (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson, 1997, p. 225, 
emphasis in original). Here, the difference between persuasion and framing could be found: 
frames activate information “already at the recipients’ disposal” and instruct citizens in “how 
to weight the often conflicting considerations” that are central to political discourse (Nelson, 
Oxley and Clawson, 1997, p. 225 – 226, emphasis in original).  
 In sum, whereas persuasion supplies new information to its audience that may result in 
a belief change, frames influence attitudes and opinions through their influence on “the 
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perceived relevance of alternative considerations” (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson, 1997, p. 
226). It is the difference between “change [of] the individual’s beliefs […] about the attitude 
object (traditional persuasion) or change how the individual weights that information 
(framing)” (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson, 1997, p. 226).  
 
2.4 Equivalency Frames versus Issue Frames  
In the previous paragraphs, the definition of framing and its conceptual boundaries were 
highlighted. In order to structure the concept of framing one step further, it is useful to look at 
the various types of frames. For instance, scholars have made a distinction between 
“thematic” and “episodic” frames (Iyengar, 1990, p. 22; De Vreese, 2012, p. 368), 
“individual” versus “news” frames (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106 – 107) and “substantive” versus 
“procedural” frames (Entman, 2004, p. 5; De Vreese, 2012, p. 268)3. However, although these 
various framing types substantially contribute to the scholarly debate on framing, the scope of 
this thesis does not allow the discussion of all different types in full depth. Due to their 
frequent occurrence in mass media and presence in political science research, this thesis will 
focus on the difference between “equivalency frames” and “issue frames” (Slothuus, 2008, p. 
3; Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 114). 
 An equivalency frame refers to a framing type where “different, but logically 
equivalent, words or phrases” (Druckman, 2001b, p. 228) are used when presenting an issue 
or problem (e.g. Slothuus, 2008, p. 3; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004, pp. 135 – 136). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For an overview of different types of frames, see also Nelson, Wittmer and Shortle (2010, p. 
11 – 40) or Chong & Druckman (2007, p. 114). Thematic frames refer to frames that highlight 
general trends, opposed to episodic frames that give attention to individual, isolated cases 
(Iyengar, 1990, p. 22). Individual frames are “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide 
individuals’ processing of information” (Entman, 1993, p. 53) whereas media frames include 
frames that are apparent in mass media (e.g. Scheufele, 1999, p. 106; Tuchman, 1978, p. 193). 
The difference between substantive and procedural frames could be described as a distinction 
in focus on the “features of an issue” (De Vreese, 2012, p. 368) versus a narrower focus based 
on “technique, success and representativeness […] of political actors’ legitimacy”  (Entman, 
2004, pp. 5 – 6, emphasis in original).  
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According to Druckman (2004, p. 671), equivalency framing typically involves the 
presentation of formally identical facts in  “either a positive or negative light”. One of the 
most cited examples of such an equivalency framing experiment is provided by Kahneman & 
Tversky (1984, p. 343). These scholars designed an experiment were participant were either 
exposed to a program that would combat an unusual Asian disease where 200 out of 600 
people “will be saved”, or a program where 400 out of 600 people “will die” (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984, p. 343; Slothuus, 2008, p. 3). In a similar vein, McNeil et al. (1982, p. 1261) 
demonstrated that patients confronted with the options of surgery or radiation were more 
likely to choose surgery when it was “described as associated with a 90 percent survival rate” 
compared to a  “10 percent mortality rate” (Kinder & Kam, 2009, p. 40).  
 However, Slothuus (2008, p. 3) remarks that this type of framing may certainly be 
useful, but not the most widely used form of framing in contemporary mass media. In reality, 
mass media actors and politicians will not present their political news in two logically 
equivalent manners. Therefore, Slothuus (2008, p. 3) argues that issue framing constitutes a 
better characterization of the contemporary mass media environment. Issue frames are 
“alternative definitions, constructions or depictions of a policy problem” (Nelson & Oxley, 
1999, p. 1041; Gamson, 1992, pp. 3 - 6). Issue frames propose a selection and emphasize 
potentially relevant considerations, which may be taken into account by receivers of those 
messages when constructing their opinion (Druckman, 2004, p. 672). As Druckman (2004, p. 
672) summarizes the key point: issue frames focus on “qualitatively different yet potentially 
relevant considerations”. Thus, issue frames particularly promote the evaluative component as 
highlighted by Entman: issue framing is more than a single position on an issue, but provides 
“meaning to an issue and suggests how to understand and think about it”  (Slothuus, 2000, p. 
3; Nelson & Kinder, 1996, p. 1057; Entman, 1993, p. 52).  
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 Examples of issue framing experiments in academic studies and mass media discourse 
are manifold. For instance, Iyengar (1990, p. 35) shows that “beliefs about who or what is 
responsible for poverty” varies considerably, depending on whether the issue of poverty is 
framed as a “societal- or individual responsibility” (see also Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p. 134). 
Studies using two issue frames find similar results: issue framing affects respondent’s attitude 
and therefore constitutes one of the most important research avenues in framing research and 
contemporary political- and media discourse (e.g. Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997; Ramirez 
& Verkuyten, 2011; Slothuus, 2008, p. 3; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004, p. 133 – 134; 
Wijnberg, 2013, p. 9-13; Lakoff, 2004, p. 4 - 10).  
 Issue frames occur in mass media because the usual complexity of political issues 
lends itself perfectly to simplify the issue or dilemma at stake and make a suggestion about 
what the core of a controversy should be about (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). In this 
context, it is argued by Jacoby (2000, p. 751) that issue framing is an “explicitly political 
phenomenon”: in order to secure favorable public opinion and the maintenance of power, it is 
important for the political elite to frame an issue in such a way as to “shine the best possible 
light on their own preferred courses of action”. With this in mind, it is important to examine 
the implications of issue-framing effects on real-world situations, to which this thesis now 
turns.  
 
2.5 The Salience of Security Issues in the United States and Europe since 9/11 
In the previous paragraphs, it has been demonstrated that scholars have researched framing 
effects “over a vast array of domains” (Druckman, 2004, p. 673), focusing on for instance 
political-, economical- or health issues (e.g. Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984, p. 343; McNeil et al., 1982, p. 1261; Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p. 134). 
Furthermore, various aforementioned studies have researched highly salient topics in 
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contemporary public debates in their issue framing experiments, such as the effects of framing 
on political tolerance for hate groups  (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997, p. 567; Ramirez & 
Verkuyten, 2011, p. 1583) or political policies such as tax reforms (Jacoby, 2000, p. 750) and 
affirmative action (Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p. 134). In other words, not only have these 
studies contributed to the academic debate on framing, these framing experiments provide 
more insights into real-world situations by covering topics severely discussed and framed in 
contemporary political- and media discourse.  
 The domain of security issues, however, remains a topic that has not received broad 
attention in issue framing studies. As will be argued in the next paragraphs, this is striking 
since the salience of (national) security issues has increased in the United States and Europe 
after 11 September 2001, whereby security issues have become severely discussed and 
framed in contemporary political- and mass media environments in the Western World (e.g. 
Domke et al., 2006, p. 306; Tsoukala, 2006, p. 611; Oppermann & Viehrig, 2009, p. 932; 
Rehman, 2007, p. 831; De Graaf & Eijkman, 2011, p. 33; Pew Research Center4, 2011). 
 In the United States, scholars and opinion polls have pointed towards a growing focus 
on security issues in this country since 11 September 2001 (e.g. Levi & Wall, 2004, p. 196; 
Mabee, 2007, p. 387; Pew Research Center, 2004).  For example, numbers provided by the 
Pew Research Center underline the increased focus on security issues after 9/11: whereas 
55% per cent of the respondents expressed the necessity to give up civil liberties in order to 
combat terrorism, only 30% in 1996 and 29% in 1997 expressed a similar opinion (Pew 
Research Center, 2013a; Pew Research Centre, 2001a). Similarly, the Pew Research Center 
reports that 9/11 reflects a turning point in opinions about national defense spending: whereas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Pew Research Center is a U.S. based, nonpartisan think tank, providing information on 
attitudes, trends and issues central to public discourse in the United States. More information 
can be found at: http://www.pewresearch.org (viewed 15 June 2013).    
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only 32% of the respondents in the pre-9/11 thought national defense spending should be 
increased, this number increased by 50% after 9/11 (Pew Research Center, 2001b).  
 Furthermore, it is reported that in the direct aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the 
American public expressed overwhelming support for Bush’s measures in order to strengthen 
national security: on September 27 – 28, 2001, “72% of adult Americans said the Bush 
Administration was ‘about right’ in its proposed degree of restrictions on civil liberties in 
response to terrorism, while another 17% said Administration goals were going ‘not far 
enough’” in order to protect national security of American citizens (Domke et al., 2006, p. 
306). In this context, it could be argued that the swift enactment of the USA PATRIOT 
(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism) Act (hereinafer USA PATRIOT Act) reflects the increased salience of security 
issues in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11. First of all, it could be argued that the 
USA PATRIOT itself is a reflection of security concerns: this legislation greatly expanded the 
authorization for the US federal government to gather information about and act in case of 
terrorist activities (Keum et al., 2005: 337 – 338)5. Secondly, the increase of security concerns 
in the US is also reflected in the process towards the enactment of this law: it is noted that the 
media was highly concerned with security-issues in the period up to the enactment of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, reflecting “the unifying impact of September 11” and security-concerns 
apparent in American society (Entman, 2003, p. 418; Domke et al., 2006, p. 306; Coe et al., 
2004, p. 234; Baker & Oneal, 2001, p. 661). Additionally, the decisive margin by which the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The complete bill text of the USA PATRIOT Act can be found at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c107:H.R.3162.ENR:%20 (accessed 4 June, 2013). For a summary of the law see 
also Regan (2004, pp. 482 – 482), Lebowitz & Posheiser, (2001, pp. 875 – 885) or the archive 
of the Department of Justice: http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm (accessed 4 
June, 2013).	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bill passed6 underlines the salience of security issues expressed by both Democrats and 
Republicans, representing a wide political spectrum (McCarty, 2002, p. 435).  
 The increased salience of security-issues was not only reflected in the direct aftermath 
of 9/11. Data provided by the Pew Research Center demonstrate that the saliency of security 
issues among the American public is still prevalent: in 2010, 47% of the respondents 
expressed that “government policies have not gone far enough to adequately protect the 
country”, as opposed to 32% expressing their worries about the curtailment of civil liberties 
(Pew Research Center, 2013a). Most recently, since the revelations from whistleblower 
Edward Snowden7 about the extensive data-gathered by the National Security Agency (NSA), 
it is noted that the American public keeps underlining the importance of security measures: 
the majority of Americans (56%) accepts the NSA phone tracking as an acceptable security 
measure to prevent terrorist attacks (Pew Research Center, 2013b).  
  
2.6 Increased Security Concerns in Europe  
In Europe, a similar trend has been observed with respect to the increased salience of security 
issues. For example, a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in France, Germany, 
Italy and Great Britain in April 2002 indicated that citizens were worried about a terrorist 
attack in the home country on comparable levels to citizens in the United States (Pew 
Research Center, 2002).  
 Another example is provided by Oppermann & Viehrig (2009, p. 931). The authors 
demonstrate that, especially in the aftermaths of terrorist attacks such as 9/11, the March 2004 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The House vote was 357 – 66, the Senate vote was 98 – 1, with Democratic Senator Russ 
Feingold the only dissenter (McCarty, 2002, p. 435).  7	  7 PRISM is the codename for a national security program performed by the National 
Security Agency (NSA) of the United States. It aims to surveillance internet-data from users 
worldwide for security reasons. The program was leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward 
Snowden on 6 June 2013 and has sparked debate about the balance between security and 
privacy in the United States and numerous other countries, including the Netherlands. 	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bombings in Madrid and the London bombings of July 2005, security concerns have become 
more salient in European democracies (e.g. Bulley, 2008, p. 389). For example, Oppermann 
& Viehrig (2009, pp. 931 – 932) demonstrate that, particularly in the United Kingdom, 
security concerns have become a highly salient issue: by studying Eurobarometer poll results, 
the authors found for example that after the London bombings, 41% of United Kingdoms 
citizens thought “foreign affairs, defense or terrorism” were the most important issues facing 
their countries at the moment (e.g. Williams, 2005, pp. 37 – 55).  
 It could also be argued that an increase of security concerns in European democracies 
is expressed through new laws concerning security issues. For instance, UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair has repeatedly voiced his support for legislative measures in the spirit of the US 
PATRIOT Act (e.g. Tsoukala, 2006, p. 611). As Lord Rooker, Home Office Minister of State 
remarked in The Guardian (28 November 2001): “The terrorist rewrote the rule book, and we 
have to do the same”. Under the guise of anti-terrorist measures, the most prominent example 
of such new legislation in the UK concerns the Terrorism Act, which was signed into law 
following the aftermath of the London bombing on July 7, 2005. In a similar vein, France 
(Tsoukala, 2006, p. 618; Feteke, 2004, p. 18) and the European Union (Den Boer & Monar, 
2002, p. 11)8 have adopted comparable legislation (Haubrich, 2003, p. 3; Warbrick, 2004, p. 
1016 – 1017).  
 Furthermore, it could be argued that the increasing salience of security issues in 
Europe is also reflected in an indirect-, cultural- and political way through the rise and 
electoral success of “populist radical right parties” in Western Europe (Mudde, 2004, p. 551). 
It is argued by Zaslove (2008, p. 323) that these parties frequently scapegoat a specific group 
in society, which is portrayed as a threat towards the national identity (Taggart, 2000, p. 19). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The Council of the European Union’s framework decision on combating terrorism can be 
found online: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/jul/frameterr622en00030007.pdf 
(accessed 6 June 2013).  
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According to Gündüz (2010, p. 41), these negative sentiments towards a certain group in 
society should be seen as an expression of the increased saliency of security issues. He argues 
that the anti-Muslim rhetoric of these populist parties frequently connects this group in 
society with cultural threats towards the national identity and “national security issues”: after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, populist radical right parties “abused the atmosphere of fear and 
anxiety to portray Muslims as a danger to the security and principles of Europe”. In other 
words, the rise of populist radical right parties in Western Europe might be interpreted as a 
symptom of the increased security concerns across the European continent, linking cultural 
arguments with security threats. 
 In the Dutch case, for example, the anti-Islam and anti-immigrant rhetoric, as 
expressed most prominently by populist LPF-politician Pim Fortuyn and later PVV-politician 
Geert Wilders, were frequently characterized by references to acts of terrorism  (Van 
Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003, p. 41; Fortuyn, 2002, p. 159; Rehman, 2007, p. 831; De Graaf & 
Eijkman, 2011, p. 33). The fact that columnist and Islam-critic Theo van Gogh9 was murdered 
by a Dutch Muslim-extremist further contributed to the sentiment that Muslims not only  
threatened the Dutch national cutlure, but were threatening the national security situation as 
well (NRC Handelsblad, 02 November 2004a; Het Parool, 02 November 2004). In other 
European countries, such as Belgium and France, similar rhetoric has been used by populist 
radical right politicians (Gündüz, 2010, p. 41; Mudde, 2004, p. 551)  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Theo van Gogh was a Dutch producer and columnist. Together with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a MP 
of the Dutch liberal party (VVD) and advocate of women rights among Islamic women, he 
produced the film Submission. The film criticized the position of Islamic women and their 
alleged maltreatment. The assassination of Theo van Gogh took place only three months after 
the film was released.  
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2.7 Different Levels of Security-Salience in the US and the Netherlands  
Salient as security issues might have become, it could be argued that there are differences in 
the perceived importance of these issues among different countries. This is for instance shown 
by the comparison between the Netherlands and the United States. The difference in emphasis 
on far-reaching safety measures concerns between these countries could be illustrated by 
comparing data from the World Values Survey10, looking at the Netherlands and the United 
States.  
As is illustrated by 
Table 1, Dutch and 
US respondents 
react differently to 
the question what 
the main aim of 
their country 
should be for the 
next ten years. 
Whereas 31,5% of 
the American 
respondents 
indicates that a strong defense force should be the most important aim of the country, only 
4,4% of the Dutch sample thinks the same way about this issue. In a similar vein, their second 
preferred choices pointed towards a similar pattern. On the other hand, issues concerned with 
personal autonomy are considered to be more important by Dutch citizens compared to their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 World Values Survey is a global research project inspired by the European Values Survey 
(EVS). This project explores people’s values and beliefs worldwide since 1981. For more 
information: www.worldvaluessurvey.org, visited 15 June 2013.  
Table 1. World Values Survey 2005 - Aims of Country   
 United States* Netherlands** 
What should the aim of your country 
be the next 10 years***? 
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 
High Level of Economic Growth 44,8% 36,2% 39,9% 28,0% 
Strong Defense Forces  31,5% 33,8% 4,4% 7,6% 
People have more say about things. 18,4% 21,7% 41,6% 33,3% 
Make our cities more beautiful  3,5% 6,5% 9,8% 23,7% 
NA/DK 1,7% 1,8% 4,3% 7,3% 
Source: World Values Survey 2005.  
*Number of respondents in United States: 1249. 
** Number of respondents in the Netherlands: 1050. 
*** Question: People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be 
for the next ten years. Here are listed some of the goals which different people would 
give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider 
the most important? And which would be the next most imp ortant? 1 is most 
important, 4 is least important.Respondents were asked to say which one of these 
they considered the most important, and which they would rate as he next most 
important? Respondents were not asked to rate them from 1 – 4, but only indicate 
their first two preferences.  
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American counterparts. Overall then, it could be argued that, although security concerns have 
increased in the United States and Europe overall, the levels of salience of security issues 
differ across the Netherlands and the US. In the next section, this paper will explain how the 
hypotheses derived from this background information and the framing- and security literature 
will be tested.  
 
2.8 Framing and Security Issues: Hypotheses 
As is demonstrated above, framing can have a significant influence on the perception of 
certain phenomena by the public: behavior and public opinion are largely affected by how an 
issue or event is framed (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 109; Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004, p. 
3). Furthermore, it has been argued that security issues have become increasingly salient in 
the United States and Europe since 9/11: opinion polls, political discourse and even law-
making reflects the increased focus on security issues in the United States and Europe. Since 
security issues have become a topic so heavily debated in the Western world, it is a serious 
gap in the academic discourse that scholars so far have not connected research of the effects 
of issue framing with the effort to try to understand the perception of security issues by the 
public. Moreover, research that aims at understanding the salience of security issues and the 
influence of issue framing upon it, would help us to understand the public and political debate 
that is centered around these issues and that has dominated a great deal of the political 
campaigns and public the debate of the last decade (Entman, 2003, p. 416 - 417; De Graaf & 
Eijkman, 2011, p. 34; Baker & Oneal, 2001, p. 661). 
 This being a justification of the present experiment when it comes to real world 
relevance, the situation with which this thesis is concerned and which is based on the 
increased salience of security issues in the Western world as outlined above, is similar to the 
focus of the aforementioned studies of Nelson, Clawon & Oxley (1997) and Ramirez & 
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Verkuyten (2011). As was shown by these scholars, political tolerance for hate groups is 
perfectly suited for an issue framing experiment, because a rally for a hate group like the 
KKK might result in a potential conflict between contrasting fundamental rights, such as 
freedom of speech for such hate groups and public safety  (Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003, p. 
243). Therefore, the influence of issue framing on political tolerance could be tested by 
focusing in each frame on one of these competing concerns at stake.  
 Consistent with these studies, it could then be argued that attitudes concerning security 
issues may also be influenced by how a frame selects, interprets and emphasizes matters of 
security. Security concerns provide another interesting case for an issue-framing experiment: 
whereas the increased salience of safety concerns has pointed towards the importance 
attached to this subject in the United States and Europe, it has been argued by critics, as is 
shown by the Dutch example, that competing issues such as privacy play an important role as 
well. The relevance of this debate has become even clearer in the light of recent discussions 
on the PRISM-scandal11: it is argued by critics that “the protection of public safety” might not 
be offered at the expense of civil liberties, such as the importance of privacy (NRC 
Handelsblad, 13 June 2013; The Guardian, 07 June 2013; Keum et al., 2005, p. 337; Dinh, 
2004, p. 461; Donohue, 2008, p. 3; NRC Handelsblad, 7 January 2004b). Therefore, in the 
experiment designed for this study, one frame will focus on the importance of national 
security issues, by discussing a new law that will allow unrestricted phone-tapping by the 
state in the light of the importance of safety concerns. The other frame will discuss this law 
merely highlighting the importance of the restrictions on security matters in the light of 
privacy.  Based on the evidence of aforementioned issue framing experiments (e.g. Nelson, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 PRISM is the codename for a national security program performed by the National Security 
Agency (NSA) of the United States. It aims to surveillance internet-data from users 
worldwide for security reasons. The program was leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward 
Snowden on 6 June 2013 and has sparked debate about the balance between security and 
privacy in the United States and numerous other countries, including the Netherlands.  
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Clawson & Oxley, 1997; Slothuus, 2008), it could be expected that issue framing, either 
focusing on public safety or privacy, will influence the opinions of participants exposed to 
one of the frames. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: If the participants are exposed to the ‘safety’ frame, then they will produce higher levels 
of agreement towards a law which allows unrestricted phone-tapping by the state than 
participants exposed to the ‘privacy’ frame.  
 
Possible differences in framing effects on a certain issue, in this case security issues, between 
different societies, has not been the focus of any framing research to this point. So far, no 
scholar has researched the effectiveness of frames in different societies by comparing the 
effects of the same frame among participants that have been socialized in different countries, 
such as a democracy and autocracy or two countries with substantial cultural differences. In 
my view, this is a shortcoming of the current framing literature, since the relevance of pre-
existing patterns of public opinion on a certain issue, which may differ from country to 
country, might prove to be significant, but there is no research so far to support this idea.   In 
this respect, security issues are not only a highly salient contemporary subject, it provides a 
good theme for comparative framing research since, as has been argued in the cases of the 
United States and the Netherlands, the salience of security issues differs in these countries.  
 In my view, it is important this comparison is made, because it will be able to shed 
light on the relationship between the effectiveness of issue framing and pre-existing patterns 
of public opinion. This is relevant because it might be able to mitigate or strengthen the belief 
that framing is one of the most important factors in understanding the way in which the public 
debate in Western countries is shaped. When, for example, it could be concluded from my 
experiment that a security frame compared to a privacy frame is much more effective in the 
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United States, where the salience of security issues was greater than in the Netherlands 
beforehand, this finding could question the relative strength of the existing literature in which 
framing is seen as major phenomena affecting public opinion. When, on the other had, the 
conclusion of the present experiment should be that a security frame is just as effective 
compared to the privacy frame in the Netherlands, this would provide further strengthening of 
the existing literature on framing. 
 Based on the differences between the United States and the Netherlands as described 
above, I will assume that the first of the two mentioned situations, in which the security frame 
is more effective in the United States is true, since security issues are more salient there than 
they are in the Netherlands. This leads me to formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
H2: If a participant has been socialized in the Netherlands, then this participant will be less 
affected by the ‘security’ frame compared to a participant socialized in the Netherlands 
exposed to the ‘privacy’ frame. 
 
H3: If a participant has been socialized in the United States, then this participant will be less 
affected by the ‘privacy’ frame compared to a participant socialized in the United States 
exposed to the ‘security’ frame. 
 
2.9 Background  
2.9.1 USA PATRIOT Act  
Since the framing articles as used in this study are based on the USA PATRIOT Act and the 
debate surrounding it, this chapter will briefly explain the background information concerning 
this law. To test the hypotheses, this thesis has designed an issue framing experiment where a 
contemporary debate concerning security concerns is highlighted: the balance between safety 
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and privacy. To illustrate this controversy, this thesis has chosen to focus on discussions 
sparked by laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act, in which context the discussion between 
privacy and security plays a prominent role.  
 In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President G.W. Bush and 
Congress progressed with “tremendous alacrity to authorize new powers for the federal 
government to prevent future terrorism” (McCarthy, 2002, p. 435). One of the most 
controversial examples of such legislation is the USA PATRIOT Act that was signed into law 
by President Bush on October 26, 2001 (Keum et al., 2005: 337 – 338). The law enlarges 
officials’ authorities to track and surveillance the collection and use of personal information, 
“removes barriers between law enforcement and intelligence services” (McCarthy, 2002, p. 
435) and expanses powers to “exclude or deport” (Sinnar, 2003, p. 1420) individuals certified 
as threatening to US national security to be held in government custody. In sum, this 
legislation greatly expanded the authorization for the US federal government to gather 
information about and act in case of terrorist activities (Keum et al., 2005: 337 – 338)12.  
 Numerous positive aspects about this act have been expressed among U.S. politicians, 
journalists and citizens. Proponents of the law have argued that a nationwide desire existed to 
tighten security measures after the collective trauma and “horror [of] watching airplanes 
ramming into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon” (Mell, 2002, p. 378). It is argued 
that this simply commanded authorities to implement far-reaching measures. This observation 
is supported by numbers of Pew Research Center: In September 2001, 86% of the Americans 
approved of Bush’s dealing with the situation right after 9/11 (Pew Research Center, 2011). 
Furthermore, Domke et al., (2006, p. 306) report that on September 27 – 28, 2001, “72% of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The complete bill text of the USA PATRIOT Act can be found at: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:H.R.3162.ENR:%20 (accessed 4 June, 2013). For 
a summary of the law see also Regan (2004, pp. 482 – 482), Lebowitz & Posheiser, (2001, pp. 
875 – 885) or the archive of the Department of Justice: 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm (accessed 4 June, 2013).	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adult Americans said the Bush Administration was “about right’ in its proposed degree of 
restrictions on civil liberties in response to terrorism, while another 17% said Administration 
goals were going ‘not far enough’”.  
 Furthermore, as is illustrated by Domke et al. (2006, p. 302) about the “echoing” 
coverage in the wake of 9/11, a majority of politicians and journalists expressed similar 
positive reactions towards the bill. It is observed that even if mass-media outlets highlighted 
dangerous implications of the bill, “fully 83% of Patriot-related news coverage […] also 
included Administration-supportive claims, with the most common emphases being security 
(78%)” (Domke et al., 2006, p. 302)13. This lead Domke et al. (2006, p. 307) to conclude that 
“contrary voices were never predominant in Patriot Act coverage”.   
 Despite its swift enactment and the decisive margin by which the bill passed14, the 
USA PATRIOT Act has increasingly sparked debate, questioning the shifted balance of two 
contrasting issues: “the protection of public safety and the preservation of civil liberties” (e.g. 
Keum et al., 2005, p. 337; Dinh, 2004, p. 461; Donohue, 2008, p. 3).  
 Opponents of the law have been vocal to criticize the opportunistic nature of the act in 
the wake of 9/11, underlining the lack of debate and thorough deliberation  (McCarthy, 2002, 
p. 435). Additionally, as Ackerman (2004, p. 1029 – 1030) has pointed out, a vicious and 
downward pattern will emerge if every potentially dangerous situation results in more 
repressive laws: this instant and unpredictable demand for increased security measures will 
lead to a dangerous “emergency constitution” (e.g. Evans, 2002, p. 933 – 935). In a similar 
vein, it is stressed by various academics that crucial checks and balances disappear such as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In their analysis of mass media coverage on the Patriot-bill, Domke et al. (2006, p. 296) 
analyzed 1620 texts between September 11 to October 25, 2001 of “newspaper articles, 
newspaper editorials and television news transcripts”, of which 230 were deemed codeable 
items.  
14 The House vote was 357 – 66, the Senate vote was 98 – 1, with Democratic Senator Russ 
Feingold the only dissenter (McCarty, 2002, p. 435).  
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lack of judicial review (e.g. Herman, 2005, p. 969; The New York Times, 28 September 
2003; The Washington Post, 14 July 2007).  
 Most importantly in this context, various scholars, politicians, journalists and citizens 
scrutinized the law as “taking away fundamental rights, guaranteed by the Constitution” 
(Ruzenski, 2004, p. 469) such as the “safeguard[ing of] privacy” as is central to the Fourth 
Amendment.  
 These critical points of view, especially concerning privacy rights, were also 
frequently expressed in the Netherlands: Dutch politicians, journalists and citizens have 
frequently demonstrated their worries about the implications of the USA PATRIOT Act with 
respect to other rights such as privacy. Eelco Bos van Rosenthal, Dutch correspondent for the 
Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation (NOS), stated: “fundamental principles of law are put 
at stake” (De Volkskrant, 27 November 2001). Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, former Liberal 
Member of the European Parliament and current Dutch Minister of Defense, has been 
prominent in calling revulsion at such restrictions on individuals’ right to privacy. In February 
2010, Hennis-Plasschaert pleaded in the European Parliament against the “EU-US interim 
agreement that guaranteed to United States security authorities continued access to European 
financial data” (De Goede, 2012, p. 214). Hennis-Plasschaert stated that “currently, our laws 
are being broken and under this agreement with its provisional application they would 
continue to be broken”15, after which the interim agreement was rejected by the European 
Parliament (De Goede, 2012, p. 214; Ripoll Servent, 2010, p. 196; Algemeen Dagblad, 12 
February 2010). She is not alone on this matter, since questions concerning privacy are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The full text of Hennis-Plasschaert’s statement on the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication)-affair can be found at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20100211+ITEM-006-
04+DOC+XML+V0//EN&query=INTERV&detail=4-093, viewed on 7 June 2013.  
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frequently asked by representatives of a large majority of political parties represented in 
Dutch parliament (e.g. NRC Handelsblad, 21 April 2011).  
 Furthermore, a report by Human Rights Watch, criticizing the war on terror as an 
opportunistic attack on civil rights, has been given broad attention in Dutch media, similarly 
to other critical voices such as various reports by the Dutch Data Protection Agency, The 
Privacy Barometer16 or Bits of Freedom17 (e.g De Volkskrant, 11 September 2002; 
Jaarverslag CPB 2012). Most recently, Jacob Kohnstamm, chairman of the Dutch Data 
Protection Authority (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, CBP), heavily criticized 
recent disclosures by Guardian (06 June 2013) about the PRISM-scandal. In a reaction, 
Kohnstamm expressed that “it is concerning that the freedom of communication is at stake. In 
Europe, protection of personal data is a fundamental, constitutional right and in the United 
States, they fundamentally look different at this matter” (NOS Journaal, 7 June 2013; 
Nieuwsuur, 7 June 2013)18. With this background in mind, this study will now turn to the 
framing experiment in which a law, as outlined in this background chapter, will be either 
framed from the perspective of the importance of security, or the importance of privacy.  
 
3. Research Methods and Data Collection  
This thesis offers an experimental approach to test the hypotheses. Its design builds on 
previous framing studies (e.g. Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997; Hiscox, 2006; Ramirez & 
Verkuyten, 2011), by exposing individual respondents to different interpretations of an issue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The ‘Privacy Barometer’ monitors the impact of laws that relate to privacy issues and het 
voting behavior of Dutch political parties on this matter.  
17 ‘Bits of Freedom’ is organization concerned with privacy on the internet.  
18 The video fragment with Kohnstamm’s statements in the news can be found at: 
http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/afleveringen/1349553 (visited 8 June 2013). His statement 
starts at 01:48. Kohnstamm’s commentary in Nieuwsuur can be found at: 
http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/afleveringen/15664193 (visited 8 June 2013). His statement 
starts at 03:44. Kohnstamm’s commentary is in Dutch.  
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(a proposed security bill) and comparing the attitudes towards this bill between the different 
treatments groups.  
 An experiment is defined as a method of research where the investigator creates and 
controls the “assignment to random conditions” (McDermott, 2002, p. 32) to which recruited 
respondents will be exposed (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p. 6; Kinder & Palfrey, 1993, p. 6 - 
10). In other words: the essence of an experiment could be summarized as a situation where 
the researcher has methodological control over both dependent and independent variables, 
“measurement of subjects” (McDermott, 2002, p. 32) and all treatments to which the 
respondents are exposed (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p. 6). In the framing experiment designed 
for this thesis, it is essential to create a situation where the control factors, except the specific 
frame and the level of security salience across the two different groups, are held ceteris 
paribus in order to measure the effect of framing on the attitudes of the respondents  (Chong 
& Druckman, 2007, p. 106). As Chong and Druckman have noted: “if the goal is to 
understand how frames in communication affect public opinion, then the researcher needs to 
isolate a specific attitude” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 106).  
 Secondly, the respondents were randomly assigned to the framing conditions. Thirdly, 
the experiment has a “posttest-only control group design” (Campbell & Stanley, 1963, pp. 25 
– 26): no indications or cues are given before the treatment, which to participants might have 
suggested what the intent of the framing experiment was (Iyengar, 1990, p. 25). As Campbell 
& Stanley (1963) have argued, a pretest is not needed if one wishes to control for the 
“problems of internal invalidity as well as for the interaction between testing and stimulus” 
(Babbie, 2010, p. 244).   
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3.1 Experimental Design and Procedure 
The experiment designed for this thesis tests whether (1) framing influences the attitudes of 
respondents towards a security bill and (2) whether differences are observable between 
citizens socialized in countries that have different levels of salience of security issues.  In 
order to test the hypotheses, this study used a posttest experimental design with four 
treatments groups and a control group. These treatments groups each read a differently framed 
newspaper article after which a survey was filled in, whereas the control group only filled in 
the survey.  To ensure that a comparison could be made between the two different socialized 
groups, respondents in both countries had to be born and raised in respectively the United 
States or the Netherlands.  
 In the spring of 2013, the experiment was conducted in the Netherlands and the United 
States. In the Netherlands, 164 students (81 males, 83 females) of Political Science at Leiden 
University participated on a voluntary and nonpayment basis. Their ages ranged from 17 to 26 
years. All students were requested to take part in scientific research on a voluntary and 
anonymous basis after the seminar. Those who agreed to participate in the paper-and-pencil-
experiment were instructed to read the newspaper article in silence in the seminar room after 
the lecture, without discussing the content of the article with each other, and were 
subsequently asked to complete the survey. Afterwards, the students were debriefed about the 
aim of the research. For logistical reasons, only one of the four articles or control group 
survey was distributed in every class: in this way, the students could not have an indication 
about the purpose of the study since all articles in the same class were identical. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that the different treatments were randomly assigned to the various seminar 
groups. However, the randomization of the experiment could have been improved by 
randomly assigning the different framing treatments to the whole group of first year Political 
Science students at once or randomly assigning them within the different seminar groups, 
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thereby downplaying the role of other factors such as the presence of the teacher or possible 
group dynamics.  
 Due to logistical, financial and time-bound reasons, the paper-and-pencil-method was 
replaced with an online survey in the United States. Although scholars have pointed towards 
disadvantages of online survey methods, such as possible “technological problems” (Evans & 
Mathur, 2005, p. 201) or “unverified respondents” (Duda & Nobile, 2010, p. 58), others have 
demonstrated several advantages of online methods such as the relatively easy accessibility of 
college students online (Van Zelm & Jankowski, 2006, p. 436; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998, p. 
378) and “time- and cost-saving” reasons (Sax, Gilmartin & Bryant, 2003, p. 410; Schmidt, 
1997, p. 275). Most importantly, various studies have shown that there are no relevant 
differences in the results between online survey methods and other methods such as paper-
and-pencil-sampling: as Couper (2001, p. 472) has pointed out, the main points of criticism 
regarding online surveys relate to the difficulty of representativeness within the internet 
population (Babbie, 2010, p. 283). However, since the experiment is conducted among a 
young, highly educated population in both countries, it is expected that no relevant 
differences will occur in relation to the online- and paper-and-pencil-method used for this 
experiment (e.g. Couper, 2001, p. 472; Taylor, 2000, p. 61; Riva, Teruzzi & Anolli, 2003, p. 
73; Vallejo et al., 2007, p. 15).  Therefore, respondents in the United States received a survey 
link. The introduction of the questionnaire indicated that responses would be treated 
confidentially and anonymously, after which each respondent received one of the five 
treatments randomly (four newspaper articles and one control group paragraph). After the 
framed article, the respondents were presented the survey. At the end of the survey, my email 
address was provided to whom respondents could address their questions. Since 25 
respondents did not fill in the survey, these cases were excluded from the analysis. The total 
number of respondents then was 74. The age of the participants (35 male, 39 female) ranged 
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from 19 to 35 years. In the discussion, the implications and constraints of this difference in 
age groups compared to the Dutch group will be further discussed.  
    
3.2 Newspaper Articles   
As was explained in previous paragraphs, participants were exposed to one of the four fictive 
newspaper articles or the control group text. The central theme of these articles related to the 
debate on and “clash between two fundamental democratic values” (Keum et al., 2005, p. 
337) of security and privacy: in a fictive situation and inspired by the USA PATRIOT Act, 
the government of New Zealand has proposed a bill which allowed the government to phone-
tap its inhabitants at any time.  
 The country of New Zealand was chosen for several reasons. It is assumed that New 
Zealand is a country with whom both Dutch and American citizens could identify, due to its 
Western culture. Furthermore, it is assumed that both countries have a fairly neutral position 
towards New Zealand: unlike, for example, China or Syria, New Zealand is not a country 
playing a large role on the world stage or has been covered in the news frequently. 
Furthermore, the Netherlands and the United States are not largely dependent on New 
Zealand in a political-, economical or militaristic way: a prominent mutual dependence does 
not exist between New Zealand and the Netherlands or the United States. Therefore, the 
country of New Zealand has been chosen to introduce the security law in the framed 
newspaper article since it is expected that this setting will draw attention to the frame itself, 
rather than distracting respondents by introducing a security law in a country with whom 
respondents might have a highly positive or negative association.  
 Both articles presented the same set of information: (1) The government in New 
Zealand has proposed a bill that would allow authorities to monitor and record the phone calls 
of New Zealanders at any time in the name of public safety; (2) The bill allows the New 
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Zealand government, primarily through the New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service  
(NZSIS), to obtain and use telephone, e-mail, and financial records from every citizen of New 
Zealand without a court order;	  (3) The parliament in New Zealand is heavily divided on this 
issue, arguing the importance of public safety versus the preservation of civil liberties.    
 The two frames then interpreted the issue at stake differently: in the ‘Public Safety’ 
frame, the chairman of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service19 stressed the 
importance of this law in the light of both conventional and unconventional threats, such as 
the dangers posed by terrorist organizations. In a similar vein, the minister of Defense20 is 
quoted, stating that “the security of New Zealand’s citizens is of crucial importance: the main 
goal of the New Zealand state is the protection of its people”. Furthermore, the minister 
underlines that “the acquired information will not be misused”. By giving these implications 
and pointing the reader towards this direction, it is expected that the respondent exposed to 
this framing condition will show a high level of support for the acceptance of this law.  
 The second framing condition was the ‘Privacy’ frame. In this frame, the preservation 
of civil liberties and privacy reflected the dominant opinion of the people interviewed. For 
instance, a professor in the field of privacy law21	   expressed his worries about the possible 
misuse of information: “how does one know and control whether the gathered information is 
only used for security purposes?”. Furthermore, Journalist Brian Kerr22 voices his concerns 
about the role of the state: “Although the state should play a role in security issue, we should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In the newspaper article, the name chosen for the chairman of the NZSIS was ‘Warren 
Tucker’, chairman of the NZSIS since 2006. The statements in the fictive newspaper articles 
do not reflect any comments or opinions by Warren Tucker.  
20 In the newspaper article, the name chosen for the minister of Defense was ‘Jonathan 
Coleman’, New Zealand’s minister of Defense since 2011. The statements in the fictive 
newspaper articles do not reflect any comments or opinions by Jonathan Coleman. 	  
21 For the professor, the name of ‘David Shearer’ was chosen, a member of the New Zealand 
Parliament. The statements in the fictive newspaper articles do not reflect any comments or 
opinions by David Shearer. 
22 The name for the journalist that appeared in the article is ‘Brian Kerr’, which does not 
resemble a real journalist in New Zealand.  
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also guard against a state that is too powerful and uncontrolled”.  It is expected that the 
‘Privacy’ frame will let the respondents think about the negative sides of the bill, thereby 
making them more perceptive to oppose the policy of the government of New Zealand.  
 However, it could also be argued that the neutrality towards New Zealand might 
trigger null-results among respondents: since New Zealand is far away and politically 
unimportant, it could be argued that the frames might not be as effective as when the 
discussion was about a situation with whom respondents could easily identify or felt that the 
proposed situation could actually influence the real-life situation of the respondent. Therefore, 
the experiment was repeated with the home country in both the Netherlands and the United 
States. This required a few contextual adjustments in the text, such as names. However, the 
opinions, information and content of the frames remained identical to the New Zealand 
articles. The full texts of the ‘Security’ and ‘Privacy’ frame in the New Zealand, Dutch and 
American situation can be found in the appendices.  
 In order to present the frames, it has been described that this study has used newspaper 
articles formats to present the frames. The design of the frames was the same in both 
countries, although the source reference for the treatment groups in the Netherlands and the 
United States differed. Using the same source reference in both countries would possibly have 
added a new variable to the experiment, since attitudes of respondents to foreign media 
sources would have come into play. It could, in a sense, have distracted respondents from the 
content of the framing condition. Therefore, both in the Netherlands and in the United States, 
the layout of national high quality newspapers was used. For the Dutch respondents, the 
newspaper articles were designed as if they appeared in NRC Handelsblad, one of the larger, 
widely read newspapers in the Netherlands. For US participants, the lay out of the newspaper 
The New York Times was used: it is argued by various scholars that both newspapers are seen 
as credible, high quality sources and elite-oriented newspapers (Hijmans et al., 2003, p. 158; 
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Janssen, 1999, p. 333; Alsem et al., 2008, p. 533; Druckman, 2001a, p. 1056; Carpenter, 
2007, p.766; Hopple, 1982, p. 61; Kiousis, 2004, p.75; Winter & Eyal, 1981, p. 379).   
 
3.3 Concepts and Measurement: Dependent & Independent Variables  
After the respondents read the articles, the post-test concluded with a questionnaire. The 
dependent and independent variables were formulated and measured as follows:  
 
Dependent variable  
To assess whether the framing condition had an effect, the participants were asked to answer 
the following question: “To what extent do you support or oppose the government security 
bill?” It is expected that respondents exposed to the ‘safety’ frame will produce higher levels 
of agreement towards this bill compared to respondents exposed to the ‘privacy’ frame.  
Respondents could rate this dependent variable on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with answers 
ranging from strongly oppose (1) to strongly support (7) (Babbie, 2010, p. 179 – 180; 
Ramirez & Verkuyten, 2011, p. 1589).  
 
Independent variables  
The main independent variable was the framing condition. The two framing conditions were 
the ‘safety’ and ‘privacy’ frame. This frame was placed in three contexts: the New Zealand 
situation and both home countries (the Netherlands and the United States). The control group 
was not exposed to a frame but read a brief introduction with some basic facts about the laws 
in the spirit of the USA PATRIOT Act. In order to analyze the effects of the various framing 
conditions on the dependent variable, four dummy variables were created: the first 
representing the control group, opposed to both frames (Dummy Control-Frame), with 0 
representing no treatment and 1 the framing conditions. The second dummy variable 
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represented the control group, opposed to the security frame (Dummy Control-Security), with 
0 representing the control group and 1 the security frame. A third dummy was created with 
the control group (0) opposed to the privacy frame (1)  (Dummy Control-Privacy). The last 
dummy variable consisted of privacy (0) opposed to security (1) (Dummy Privacy-Control).  
 Additionally, the survey conducted background checks for gender (male 0, female 1), 
country of birth (0 outside home country, 1 home country) and country of residence (0 outside 
home country, 1 home country). Furthermore, respondents were asked to indicate how 
connected they felt with their country on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 Strongly unconnected, 
7 strongly connected). Furthermore, respondents were asked to tell their age and ethnic 
background. In addition, respondents were asked to indicate their left-right political 
orientation, based on a similar scale used by Ramirez and Verkuyten (2011, p. 1590), ranging 
from 1 (extreme left) to 11 (extreme right).  
 Lastly, the survey repeated one question identical to the World Values Survey 
question in order to compare the salience given to security issues between both samples: 1. 
‘People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. 
Here are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you 
please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?’ Participants could 
choose between (a) A high level of economic growth, (b) Making sure this country has strong 
defense forces,  (c) Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs 
and in their communities and (d) Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. 
The survey can be found in the appendices.  
 
4. Data Analysis  
It was expected that respondents exposed to the ‘security’ frame would show higher levels of 
support for a security-related bill compared to participants exposed to a ‘privacy’ frame. 
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Secondly, it was predicted that due to the lower salience of security issues in the Netherlands, 
Dutch respondents exposed to the ‘security’ frame would be less affected compared to Dutch 
respondents exposed to the ‘privacy’ frame. Thirdly, it was hypothesized that US respondents 
exposed to the ‘privacy’ frame would be less affected compared to US respondents exposed to 
the ‘security’ frame. In order to test these hypotheses, an ordinary least squares regression 
analysis (OLS) was conducted to predict the value of the independent variable (attitude 
towards the security bill) from the independent variables. Because the outcome variable is not 
dichotomous but linear, the political tolerance scale is analyzed by simple linear regression 
for both samples. Table 2 will firstly presents the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression analysis for the Netherlands.  
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In table 2, the results for the OLS regressions models for the Dutch sample are presented. 
Model 1 represents an OLS-regression analysis only including the control variables without 
the various framing variables. The other models represent the OLS-regressions, each 
including a different dummy variable concerning the different framing treatments. According 
to hypothesis 1, it is expected that if the participants are exposed to the ‘safety’ frame, then 
Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model Predicting Attitude 
Towards Security Bill in the Netherlands 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Sex -0.47 
(.268) 
-0.50 
(.269) 
.003  
(.371) 
.018  
(.357) 
-.119 
(.290) 
Age -.187* 
(.081) 
-.204* 
(.087) 
-.244 
(.118) 
-.123 
(.121) 
-.218* 
(.097) 
Country Born .045  
(.646) 
.043  
(.649) 
.152 
(1.054) 
-.073 
(.859) 
.045  
(.657) 
Country Raised -.051 
(.808) 
-.054 
(,813) 
.081 
(1.608) 
-.130 
(.950) 
-.061 
(.826) 
Country Connected .071  
(.103) 
.070  
(.104) 
.093  
(.144) 
.058  
(.129) 
.052  
(.116) 
Ethnicity .050 (.476) .040  
(.487) 
.065  
(.727) 
.045  
(.648) 
.036 (.501) 
Religion -.044 
(.338) 
-.045 
(.339) 
.036  
(.499) 
-.026 
(.438) 
-.070 
(.364) 
Left-Right  .070  
(.076) 
.072  
(.076) 
-.021 
(.108) 
.180  
(.103) 
.059  
(.081) 
Dummy Control-Frame  -.045 
(.408) 
   
Dummy Control-Security   -.038 
(.477) 
  
Dummy Control-Privacy    -.041 
(.436) 
 
Dummy Privacy-Security     -.016 
(.277) 
R² .060 .062 .113 .059 .081 
Number of Cases 164 164 92 93 143 
Notes: Table entries are standardized regression coefficients (with standard errors in 
parentheses).  
* Indicates the coefficient is statistically significant at the level 0.05≥p>0.01. 
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they will produce higher levels of agreement towards a law which allows unrestricted phone-
tapping by the state than participants exposed to the ‘privacy’ frame. Model 5 fails to confirm 
hypothesis 1 in the Dutch sample: as is demonstrated by this model, an opposite direction is 
shown since a person, who is exposed to a security frame compared to a participant exposed 
to a privacy frame will show .016 point less support for the law (on a 7 point scale), although 
this finding is also not statistically significant. Therefore, for the Dutch sample, hypothesis 1 
could be rejected.  
 Furthermore, as hypothesized in hypothesis 2, it was expected that if a participant has 
been socialized in the Netherlands, then this participant will be less affected by the ‘security’ 
frame compared to a participant socialized in the Netherlands exposed to the ‘privacy’ frame. 
As is shown in model 4, although the respondents exposed to privacy frame in comparison to 
the control group show .041 point less support for the law (on a 7 point scale), this finding is 
not statistically significant. Furthermore, as is illustrated by model 3, respondents exposed to 
security frame in comparison to the control group show .038 point less support for the law (on 
a 7 point scale), whereby this finding is not statistically significant. Since these findings are 
not statistically significant, hypothesis 2 could be rejected.  
 In table 4, the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis for the 
United States sample will be represented.  
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Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model Predicting Attitude Towards 
Security Bill in the United States 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Sex .191 (.405) .191 (.408) .252 (.586) .028 (.516) .242 (.471) 
Age -.263* 
(.052) 
-.262* 
(.053) 
-.299 
(.080) 
-.206 
(.069) 
-.233 
(.060) 
Country_Born -.024 
(.813) 
-,022 
(.827) 
.058 (.953) -.064 
(1.313) 
-.050 
(1.045) 
Country_Raised -.188 
(.869) 
-.190 
(.886) 
-.284 
(1.101) 
-.113 
(1.343) 
-.181 
(1,054) 
Country_Connected .067 (.109) .069 (.113) -,003 
(,168) 
.138 (.134) .051 (.136) 
Ethnicity -.025 
(.614) 
-.025 
(.620) 
-,033 
(,739) 
.113 
(1.128) 
-.061 
(.706) 
Religion .000 (.452) .002 (.460) -.002 
(.670) 
.-142 
(.638) 
.062 (.485) 
Left-Right  .244 (.108) .245 (.109) .281 (.156) .138 (.140) .300* 
(.127) 
Dummy Control-Frame  -.009 
(.505) 
   
Dummy Control-Security   .042 (.672)   
Dummy Control-Privacy    -.047 
(.566) 
 
Dummy Privacy-Security     .080 (.452) 
R² .198 .198 .262 .117 .279 
Number of Cases 74 74 44 46 58 
Notes: Table entries are standardized regression coefficients (with standard errors in 
parentheses).  
* Indicates the coefficient is statistically significant at the level 0.05≥p>0.01. 
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In table 4, the results for the OLS regressions models for the US sample are presented. Model 
1 represents an OLS-regression analysis only including the control variables without the 
various framing variables. The other models represent the OLS-regressions, each including a 
different dummy variable concerning the different framing treatments. According to 
hypothesis 1, it is expected that if the participants are exposed to the ‘safety’ frame, then they 
will produce higher levels of agreement towards a law which allows unrestricted phone-
tapping by the state than participants exposed to the ‘privacy’ frame.  
 As is shown by model 5, an American respondents exposed to a security frame 
compared to an American participant exposed to a privacy frame will show .080 point more 
support for the law (on a 7 point scale), although this finding is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, also for the American sample, hypothesis 1 could be rejected.  
 Furthermore, hypothesis 3 expected that if a participant has been socialized in the 
United States, then this participant will be less affected by the ‘privacy’ frame compared to a 
participant socialized in the United States exposed to the ‘security’ frame. As is shown in 
model 3, American respondents exposed to security frame in comparison to the control group 
show .042. point more support for the law (on a 7 point scale), although this finding is not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, as is illustrated by model 4, respondents exposed to 
privacy frame in comparison to the control group show .047 point less support for the law (on 
a 7 point scale), but this finding is also not statistically significant. Since these findings are 
not statistically significant, hypothesis 3 could be rejected.  
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5. Discussion  
This study has investigated the effects of framing on the attitudes of respondents towards a 
controversial security-bill. The results have shown that framing does not have an impact: 
since the findings were not statistically significant, the hypothesis stating that participants 
exposed to the ‘security’ frame would produce higher levels of agreement compared to 
respondents exposed to the ‘privacy’ frame had to be rejected. Furthermore, although the 
American sample demonstrated the expected direction concerning this hypothesis, the Dutch 
sample demonstrated a reverse pattern.  Furthermore, hypothesis 2 expected that if a 
participant had been socialized in the Netherlands, then this participant will be less affected 
by the ‘security’ frame compared to a participant socialized in the Netherlands exposed to the 
‘privacy’ frame. This hypothesis was also rejected: although the effect was slightly stronger 
for the privacy frame on the attitude towards the security-bill, the effects were not statistically 
significant. Similarly, hypothesis 3, expecting that if a participant had been socialized in the 
United States, then this participant will be less affected by the ‘privacy’ frame compared to a 
participant socialized in the United States exposed to the ‘security’ frame, could not be 
confirmed.  
 These conclusions should be seen in the light of further implications. First of all, it 
could be questioned whether the context and timing in which the experiment took place may 
have influenced the outcomes of the experiment. The choice for a present-day subject for a 
framing experiment, like the USA PATRIOT Act, provides more insight into very present-day 
subjects, thereby contributing to a better understanding of the world we live in. However, it 
may be argued that exactly this may have biased the framing experiment: due to the recent 
revived discussion in the United States about espionage practices of U.S. authorities, the 
framing effects might be less strongly due to predispositions among the American public. As 
Chong and Druckman (2007, p. 112) observe: “The success of any given attempt to frame an  
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issue also depends on whether other information is available to the audience”. In the case of 
the experiment conducted for this thesis, it might be argued that especially U.S. respondents 
were influenced by recent developments on the issue: On June 6, 2013, the Washington Post 
published a controversial article about practices by the Obama Administration on wire-
tapping telephone- and email traffic of U.S.- and non-U.S. citizens. Since most of the U.S. 
respondents filled in the online survey between June 6 2013 and June 25, 2013, it might be 
argued that U.S. respondents were highly primed towards the critical stance as adopted by 
most U.S. newspapers and television channels.  
Table 4 might further illustrate this point. As is shown by the comparison between the data 
from the World Values Survey 2005, as presented earlier in this thesis, and the data responses 
Table 4. World Values Survey 2005 & Framing Sample (2013): Aims of Country   
 United States* Netherlands** 
What should the aim of your country be the 
next 10 years****? 
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 
High Level of Economic Growth 44,8% 
(25%) 
36,2% 
(37,5%) 
39,9% 
(61,9%) 
28,0% 
(23,8%) 
Strong Defense Forces  31,5% 
(0%) 
33,8% 
(12,5%) 
4,4% 
(4,8%) 
7,6% 
(14,3%) 
People have more say about things. 18,4% 
(50%) 
21,7% 
(25%) 
41,6% 
(14,3%) 
33,3% 
(38,1%) 
Make our cities more beautiful  3,5% 
(18,8%) 
6,5% 
(18,8%) 
9,8% 
(14,3%) 
23,7% 
(19,0%) 
NA/DK 1,7% 
(6,3%) 
1,8% 
(6,3%) 
4,3% 
(4,8%) 
7,3% 
(4,8%) 
Source: World Values Survey 2005 and data set from author.  
*Number of respondents in United States WVS 2005: 1249. Number of respondents in the United States control 
group (in parentheses): 16. 
** Number of respondents in the Netherlands WVS 2005: 1050. Number of respondents in the Netherlands control 
group (in parentheses): 21.  
**** Question: People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Here 
are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of 
these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the next most imp ortant? 1 is most 
important, 4 is least important.Respondents were asked to say which one of these they considered the most 
important, and which they would rate as he next most important? Respondents were not asked to rate them from 1 
– 4, but only indicate their first two preferences.  
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of the control groups for both countries on the question about what the aim of their country 
should be for the next ten years, the American sample for this thesis demonstrates a different 
pattern compared to the WVS data. As will be argued below, it should be noted that size of 
the American sample is low, which is also reflected in the small control group (N=16), 
compared to the large group from WVS (N=1249).  However, this small sample demonstrates 
less salience for security issues and more salience for issues concerning autonomy for people.  
Thus, it might be argued that the opinion of the control group and eventual framing effects 
could have been different, when U.S. espionage scandal had not been severely discussed 
during the time of the experiment and the media coverage of privacy- and security issues 
would not have been so controversial and widely debated. 
 This observation leads to a second implication, namely the influence of mass media 
outside political settings. As is argued in the last paragraph, mass media might have 
influenced framing effects among U.S. respondents. However, exactly this point is where the 
external validity and the importance of framing effects becomes clear: framing is not only an 
important subject in academic research, it is also a powerful tool used by politicians, 
journalists, opinion makers and citizens to establish and influence public opinion. In the 
writing process of this thesis, it was impossible to predict the actions by whistleblower 
Snowden and the impact his disclosures would have on discussions in U.S. society. Although 
at this point, it remains hard to determine to what extent the framing conditions used in this 
experiment influenced public opinion or the recent debates in U.S. mass media played a 
prominent role, it illustrates that the controversy depicted is not only of importance in 
laboratory settings. Therefore, the choice of subjects of most issue framing experiments may 
not only demonstrate framing effects in these settings, but these framing examples are used on 
a daily basis in mass media outlets and influence public opinion on a society-wide level 
(Brants & Van Praag, 2005, p. 2; Zaller, 1992, p. 30; Entman, 1993, p. 52).  
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 The findings of this study are subject to several limitations. First of all, in this study, 
the majority of respondents were from the Netherlands. However, for the purpose of 
comparative research, it would have improved the project if a similar number of respondents 
could have been found in the United States. Furthermore, the number of cases for both 
samples was relatively low.  
  Secondly, although it was argued elsewhere (e.g. Van Zelm & Jankowski, 2006, p. 
436; Shaefer & Dillman, 1998, p. 378) that online methods were perfectly suited for 
university students, it appeared that direct face-to-face contact was far more effective to 
recruit respondents than approaching them through online methods: students might forget 
about the link or ignore it. On the other hand, it could be questioned whether a paper-and-
pencil-method, with the instructor near, would lead to more socially desired responses than 
anonymous and online survey responses. Although the scope of this thesis did not allow to 
execute this, a good way to investigate these questions would have been to conduct an 
experiment both online and on paper-and-pencil in the same country. In this way, a 
comparison could be made to test whether the differences between both countries could have 
been attributed only to framing effects, instead of possible differences in research methods.  
 A third limitation could be found in the contrast between the highly homogeneous 
group of respondents in the Netherlands and the more diverse participants in the United 
States. The vast majority of Dutch students were first-year political science students. Due to 
differences between the educational systems in the United States and the Netherlands, it was 
difficult to acquire first-year political science students in the Netherlands: whereas Dutch 
political science students declare their majors right away, the American system does not 
follow the same procedure. Even if students choose to do their major in political science, they 
may still follow various courses in other fields. Therefore, it was hard to find U.S. students 
matching the qualification of ‘first year political science students’. However, this does not 
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mask the fact that Dutch respondents were overwhelmingly first year political science 
students, whereas the American population has more diverse study backgrounds.  For a neater 
comparison, it would have been better if an American group of first- or second year students 
who already declared their political science major could have been found.  
 On the other hand, the characteristics of the Dutch sample lead to another possible 
constraint: the study background of the majority of the students (political science) might have 
biased the results. It could be argued that especially political science students, with a general 
high political awareness and knowledge about media processes such as framing, might not be 
as easily influenced by framing experiments compared to other, less-politically and media-
conscious citizens. In other words, it could be questioned whether political sciences students 
is the right target group for this experiment. However, since various framing studies have 
used this type of students for their framing research (e.g. Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997, p. 
570; Druckman, 2004, p. 675), this case selection could be defended. It should be bear in 
mind that the influence of framing experiments might be different among other groups.  
 In the future, studies could expand this study by adding more cases: more students in 
especially the United States could be recruited to participate in this scientific research, thereby 
further contributing to the research for national differences in issue framing effects. 
 Furthermore, future research could focus on additional cases that might provide useful 
information about comparative framing effectiveness and the influence of the level of 
securitization. For instance, how effective would framing effects about security issues be if 
these experiments are conducted in a country with military censorship? For instance, as 
Nossek and Limor (2001, p. 2) have observed about the Israeli media system: “although Israel 
is considered to be a democratic state, military censorship has been in operation since the 
state’s establishment in 1948”. These longstanding beliefs have an influence on the effects of 
media framing in the Israeli society. In their study, Sheafer and Dvir-Gvirsman have analyzed 
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the impact of media framing on the public opinion of Israeli’s regarding the Oslo peace 
process: the negative framing of the Israeli media, which resulted in the presentation of 
worsening security conditions, had greater influence on Israeli’s public opinion towards the 
peace process than the coverage of improving conditions (Sheafer & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010: 
211).  In other words, a case like Israel would be interesting to broaden knowledge about 
framing effects in a comparative perspective.  
 In countries were the salience of security issues has increased and the media’s role is 
of significant importance, studies linking the issue framing effects on security-issues make a 
useful contribution in our understanding of real-world developments and problems in 
contemporary Western societies. Furthermore, a comparative approach to framing studies 
remains an issue that has not been thoroughly investigated. This study aims to make a humble 
contribution to fill this scholarly knowledge gap.  
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6. Appendices 
 
6.1 Appendix 1: Frames New Zealand  
 
Security  Privacy  
Headline: New Zealand’s government is 
committed to protect its citizens with 
security bill.  
Headline: Privacy threatened in New 
Zealand by government’s security bill.  
How far will the government of New 
Zealand go to protect its citizens? The 
government in New Zealand has proposed a 
bill that would allow authorities to monitor 
and record the phone calls of New 
Zealanders at any time in the name of public 
safety. Parliament will vote on the bill next 
week.  
Is New Zealand’s government overplaying 
its hand? The government in New Zealand 
has proposed a bill that would allow 
authorities to monitor and record the phone 
calls of New Zealanders at any time in the 
name of public safety. Parliament will vote 
on the bill next week.  
The bill allows the New Zealand 
government, primarily through the New 
Zealand Secret Intelligence Service  
(NZSIS), to obtain and use telephone, e-mail, 
and financial records from every citizen of 
New Zealand without a court order. 
Parliament is heavily divided on the potential 
legal changes. Supporters explain the need 
for this bill in the light of public safety and 
the need of the state to protect its citizens. 
However, the bill has generated a great deal 
of controversy. Opponents of the bill have 
pointed towards the curtailment of privacy of 
New Zealand’s citizens and the possible 
arbitrary application of the bill by security 
services.   
The bill allows the New Zealand 
government, primarily through the New 
Zealand Secret Intelligence Service  
(NZSIS), to obtain and use telephone, e-mail, 
and financial records from every citizen of 
New Zealand without a court order. 
Parliament is heavily divided on the potential 
legal changes. Supporters explain the need 
for this bill in the light of public safety and 
the need of the state to protect its citizens. 
However, the bill has generated a great deal 
of controversy. Opponents of the bill have 
pointed towards the curtailment of privacy of 
New Zealand’s citizens and the possible 
arbitrary application of the bill by security 
services.   
The draft bill has also been a controversial 
topic in New Zealand’s public debate, with 
much concern focused on the safety of New 
Zealanders in a more dangerous world. 
Warren Tucker, chairman of the New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Service 
(NZSIS), remarked: “This law is of crucial 
importance in the light of both 
conventional and unconventional threats, 
such as the dangers posed by terrorist 
organizations”.  Similarly, New Zealand’s 
minister of Defense, Jonathan Coleman, 
underlined that  “the security of New 
Zealand’s citizens is of crucial importance: 
the main goal of the New Zealand state is 
the protection of its people. Furthermore, 
people should know that the acquired 
information will not be misused”.  
The draft bill has also been a controversial 
topic in New Zealand’s public debate, with 
much concern focused on the worries about 
privacy in New Zealand. Law professor 
David Shearer, an expert in the field of 
privacy law, remarked: “how does one 
know and control whether the gathered 
information is only used for security 
purposes?” Journalist Brian Kerr worries 
about the role of the state: “Should the 
state really intervene on such a personal 
level?  Although the state should play a 
role in security issue, we should also guard 
against a state that is too powerful and 
uncontrolled. This bill means a severe 
containment of rights related to privacy”.  
Source: New York Times/NRC Handelsblad, 
20 April 2008.  
Source: New York Times/NRC Handelsblad, 
20 April 2008. 
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6.2 Appendix 2: Frames United States   
 
Security  Privacy   
Headline: Administration committed to 
protect citizens with security bill.  
Headline: Privacy threatened by 
administration’s security bill.  
How far will the administration go to 
protect its citizens? The administration 
has proposed a bill that would allow 
authorities to monitor and record the phone 
calls of Americans at any time in the name 
of public safety. The House of 
Representatives will vote on the bill next 
week.  
Is the administration overplaying its 
hand? The administration has proposed a 
bill that would allow authorities to monitor 
and record the phone calls of Americans at 
any time in the name of public safety. The 
House of Representatives will vote on the 
bill next week.  
The bill allows the government, primarily 
through the FBI, to obtain and use 
telephone, e-mail, and financial records 
from every citizen of the United States 
without a court order. The House is heavily 
divided on the potential legal changes. 
Supporters explain the need for this bill in 
the light of public safety and the need of 
the state to protect its citizens. However, 
the bill has generated a great deal of 
controversy. Opponents of the bill have 
pointed towards the curtailment of privacy 
of US citizens and the possible arbitrary 
application of the bill by security services.   
The bill allows the government, primarily 
through the FBI, to obtain and use 
telephone, e-mail, and financial records 
from every citizen of the United States 
without a court order. The House is heavily 
divided on the potential legal changes. 
Supporters explain the need for this bill in 
the light of public safety and the need of 
the state to protect its citizens. However, 
the bill has generated a great deal of 
controversy. Opponents of the bill have 
pointed towards the curtailment of privacy 
of US citizens and the possible arbitrary 
application of the bill by security services.   
The draft bill has also been a controversial 
topic in the public debate, with much 
concern focused on the safety of 
Americans in a more dangerous world. 
FBI-director Louis Freeh remarked: 
“This law is of crucial importance in the 
light of both conventional and 
unconventional threats, such as the 
dangers posed by terrorist 
organizations”.  Similarly, secretary of 
Defense William Cohen, underlined that  
“the security of US citizens is of crucial 
importance: the main goal of the 
American state is the protection of its 
people. Furthermore, people should 
know that the acquired information will 
not be misused”.  
The draft bill has also been a controversial 
topic in the public debate, with much 
concern focused on the worries about 
privacy in the US. Law professor David 
Shearer, an expert in the field of privacy 
law, remarked: “how does one know and 
control whether the gathered 
information is only used for security 
purposes?” Journalist Brian Kerr 
worries about the role of the state: 
“Should the state really intervene on 
such a personal level?  Although the 
state should play a role in security issue, 
we should also guard against a state that 
is too powerful and uncontrolled. This 
bill means a severe containment of rights 
related to privacy”.  
Source: New York Times, 20 April 2000.  Source: New York Times, 20 April 2000. 
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6.3 Appendix 3: Frames The Netherlands (in Dutch)  
	  
Veiligheid Privacy 
Kop: Kabinet beschermt burgers met nieuwe 
veiligheidswet.    
Kop: Privacy in het geding door nieuw 
wetsvoorstel  
Hoe ver zal het kabinet gaan om burgers 
te beschermen? De regering heeft een 
wetsvoorstel ingediend dat de autoriteiten 
bevoegdheden geeft om telefoonverkeer van 
burgers te allen tijde af te luisteren en op te 
nemen in het belang van de openbare 
veiligheid.  De Tweede Kamer stemt 
volgende week over het voorstel.  
Gaat het kabinet te ver met haar laatste 
wetsvoorstel? De regering heeft een 
wetsvoorstel ingediend dat de autoriteiten 
bevoegdheden geeft om telefoonverkeer van 
burgers te allen tijde af te luisteren en op te 
nemen in het belang van de openbare 
veiligheid.  De Tweede Kamer stemt 
volgende week over het voorstel.  
Het wetsvoorstel geeft de Nederlandse 
regering de bevoegdheid, met name de 
Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst 
(AIVD), om informatie over telefoon-, email- 
en financieel verkeer van iedere burger in te 
winnen en te gebruiken, zonder tussenkomst 
van een rechter. Het parlement is ernstig 
verdeeld over het nieuwe voorstel.  
Voorstanders leggen de noodzaak van de wet 
uit door te wijzen op openbare veiligheid en 
de taak van de staat om haar burgers te 
beschermen. Desalniettemin heeft het 
voorstel veel stof doen opwaaien. 
Tegenstanders wijzen op de inperking van 
privacy en de mogelijke willekeur van 
inlichtingendiensten.    
Het wetsvoorstel geeft de Nederlandse 
regering de bevoegdheid, met name de 
Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst 
(AIVD), om informatie over telefoon-, email- 
en financieel verkeer van iedere burger in te 
winnen en te gebruiken, zonder tussenkomst 
van een rechter. Het parlement is ernstig 
verdeeld over het nieuwe voorstel.  
Voorstanders leggen de noodzaak van de wet 
uit door te wijzen op openbare veiligheid en 
de taak van de staat om haar burgers te 
beschermen. Desalniettemin heeft het 
voorstel veel stof doen opwaaien. 
Tegenstanders wijzen op de inperking van 
privacy en de mogelijke willekeur van 
inlichtingendiensten.    
Het voorstel wordt ook breed bediscussieerd 
in het publieke debat, waarin veel aandacht 
wordt gegeven aan de veiligheid van 
Nederlanders in een steeds gevaarlijkere 
wereld.  Rob Bertholee, voorzitter van de 
AIVD, stelt: “Deze wet is zeer belangrijk 
in het kader van conventionele en 
onconventionele bedreigingen, zoals de 
risico’s van terroristische organisaties”.  
Ook Eimert van Middelkoop, minister van 
defensie, onderstreept dat “de veiligheid 
van Nederlanders van cruciaal belang is: 
het doel van de staat is de bescherming 
van haar burgers.  Daarnaast moeten 
burgers weten dat de informatie niet zal 
worden misbruikt.”  
Het voorstel wordt ook breed bediscussieerd 
in het publieke debat, waarin veel aandacht 
wordt gegeven aan zorgen omtrent privacy. 
Jacob Kohnstamm, voorzitter van het 
College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens,  
stelt: “Hoe weten en controleren we dat de 
informatie alleen zal worden gebruikt voor 
veiligheidsdoeleinden?” Journalist Brenno 
de Winter plaatst kanttekeningen bij de 
macht van de staat: “Mag de staat zich 
inmengen in het persoonlijk leven van 
burgers? Alhoewel de staat een rol moet 
spelen in veiligheidsvraagstukken, moeten 
we ook waakzaam zijn voor een staat die 
te machtig en ongecontroleerd is. Dit 
wetsvoorstel betekent een forse inbreuk op 
het recht op privacy”.  
Bron: NRC Handelsblad, 20 April 2008.  Bron: NRC Handelsblad, 20 April 2008. 	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6.4 Appendix 4: Survey  
 
SURVEY  
Please carefully read the article on the next page. Afterwards, please fill in the survey. This 
survey will take about 10 minutes to complete. Your responses will be confidential and 
anonymous. Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.  
 
1. To what extent do you support or oppose the government security bill?                              
Strongly 
oppose  
Somewhat 
oppose 
Slightly 
oppose  
Neutral Slightly 
support 
Somewhat 
support 
Strongly 
support  
 
 
2. Which of the following values do you think is most important? 
 [  ] a. Security [  ] b. Privacy  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Z.O.Z. 
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3. How do you feel about the following statements? 
 
Federal government should protect its citizens, even if this is at the expense of other 
rights. 
Strongly 
oppose 
Somewhat 
oppose  
Slightly 
oppose 
Neutral  Slightly 
support 
Somewhat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
 
The state should never interfere with privacy of citizens.  
Strongly 
oppose 
Somewhat 
oppose  
Slightly 
oppose 
Neutral  Slightly 
support 
Somewhat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
 
The world is becoming more dangerous.   
Strongly 
oppose 
Somewhat 
oppose  
Slightly 
oppose 
Neutral  Slightly 
support 
Somewhat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
 
In everyday life, I feel generally safe.  
Strongly 
oppose 
Somewhat 
oppose  
Slightly 
oppose 
Neutral  Slightly 
support 
Somewhat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
 
Federal government should take more action to protect its citizens.  
Strongly 
oppose 
Somewhat 
oppose  
Slightly 
oppose 
Neutral  Slightly 
support 
Somewhat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
 
There is a human right to privacy.  
Strongly 
oppose 
Somewhat 
oppose  
Slightly 
oppose 
Neutral  Slightly 
support 
Somewhat 
support 
Strongly 
support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Z.O.Z. 
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General Questions  
If more options are given, please indicate what options is most applicable to your situation.   
 
1. What is your gender?   
[  ]a.  Male      [  ] b. Female 
  
2. What is your age?   
       
3. What course do you study?     
    
4. Which year of study?      
[  ] a. Bachelor, jaar 1/1  [  ] b. Bachelor, jaar 2/2   [  ] c. Bachelor, jaar 3/3  [  ] 
d.Master/423 
   
5. In which country were you born?             
[  ] a. The Netherlands     [  ] b. United States   [  ] c. Israel   [  ] d. Other country, 
namely:  
                 
6. Have you lived most of your life in 
[  ] a. The Netherlands     [  ] b. United States   [  ] c. Israel   [  ] d. Other country, 
namely:  
       
7. How connected do you feel with your country?  
Strongly 
unconnected 
Somewhat 
unconnected 
Slightly 
unconnected 
 
Neutral  
Slightly 
connected 
Somewhat 
connected 
Strongly 
connected 
 
8. What is your ethnic background?24  
[  ] White/Caucasian  
[  ] African American  
[  ] Hispanic 
[  ] Asian  
[  ] Native American  
[  ] Pacific Islander 
[  ] Other, namely:  
 
9. Do you consider yourself to be religious? If so, what religion?   
 
10. With which political party do you feel most affinity? 25 
[  ] Democratic Party  
[  ] Republican Party  
[  ] Other, namely:    
          Z.O.Z. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Bold numbers appeared on the American survey.  
24 Answers of question 8 only appeared in the online American survey. For Dutch 
respondents, the question was open-ended.	  	  
25 Dutch respondents could indicate their political affiliation through an open-ended question. 
Naturally, the options ‘Democratic Party’ and ‘Republican Party’ only appeared in the 
American survey.  
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11. If 1 means 'extreme left' and 11 'extreme right', where would you place yourself 
on this political scale? 
1 
Extreme 
left 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Extreme 
Right  
 
 
12. 26If you had to choose, which one of the following things would you say is most 
important? And which would be the next most important? 1 is most important, 4 
is least important.  
[  ] a. Maintaining order in the nation 
[  ] b. Giving people more say in important government decisions 
[  ] c. Fighting rising prices 
[  ] d. Protecting freedom of speech 
 
 
13. 27People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the 
next ten years. Here are listed some of the goals which different people would 
give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider 
the most important? And which would be the next most important? 1 is most 
important, 4 is least important.  
 
[  ] a. A high level of economic growth 
[  ] b. Making sure this country has strong defense forces 
[  ] c. Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in   
 their communities 
[  ] d. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful 
 
14. 28To what degree are you worried about the following situations? 
 
 Very much  A good deal  Niet erg 
bezorgd 
Not much  DK/NA  
a. Losing my job or not finding a job      
b. A war involving my country      
c. A terrorist attack      
d. A civil war      
e. Government wire-tapping or reading my 
mail or email 
     
f. The financial crisis      
g. The detoriation of civil rights      
 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. Your input is appreciated. If you have 
any questions, please email m.a.r.reuters@umail.leidenuniv.nl.   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Question 12 is based on the World Value Survey 2010 – 2012, V62 - V63. 
27 Question 13 is based on the World Value Survey 2010 – 2012, V60 - V61.	  28	  Question 14 is based on the World Value Survey 2010 – 2012, V181 – V186. 	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6.5 Appendix 5: Lay Out New York Times  
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7.6 Appendix 6: Lay Out NRC Handelsblad (in Dutch)  
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